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Abstract
Many developed countries have been experiencing sub-replacement fertility. This leads to worries over the
sustainability of economic growth in these countries. Given this concern, we ask the following questions: Is
there a force out there that would allow economic growth and declining population to coexist? Is there a
mechanism that could push fertility back up? We argue that returns to human capital in production provide
the key to understanding this relation. Our theoretical framework predicts that, when the degree of increasing
returns to human capital in traditional production technologies falls, advanced economies switch their pro-
ductive eorts from labor-oriented technologies that require a constant creation of young workforce toward
human capital-oriented technologies that support an ageing population. We call this shift the \endogenous
eciency-augmenting mechanism". This suggests that sustained economic growth and a declining population
can coexist in the long run. Finally, we compare our model against the data and nd: (i) The degree of
increasing returns to human capital has been falling over time throughout the world along with population
growth rates. (ii) Increasing returns to human capital and population growth rates are positively correlated.
(iii) Predictions of our model are consistent with what the data reveal.
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A majority of the developed countries are expected to face declining populations in the foresee-
able future if their fertility rates stay below the replacement rates. Japan is the most prominent
example. As a result of ve consecutive decades of low birth rates and almost no net immigra-
tion, its population fell by 0.01 percent in 2005, followed by zero growth in 2006 and 2007, and
a 0.06 percent decline in 2008. Recent population projections of the Ministry of Internal Aairs
and Communications in Japan suggest that Japanese population, which is currently around 127
million, will decline steadily during the rst half of the 21st century to reach 95 million|close
to its 1960 levels|in 2050. Similar concerns are raised for many European and Asian nations.
The United States has relatively high fertility, but still way below its historical standards.
Among the most signicant issues is the impact of declining population on economic growth. In
this paper, we ask the following questions: Is there a force out there that would allow economic
growth and declining population to coexist? Is there a mechanism that could push fertility back
up? The literature on fertility and economic growth argues that, along the development path,
parents have fewer children each with higher quality. As a result, fertility declines and the stock
of human capital grows, which lead to sustained economic growth in per capita terms. This is
the main mechanism suggested by many papers including Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990)
and Galor and Weil (1999, 2000). It explains what happens at the early stages of development
quite well.1 Our research is motivated by the observation that there is no serious theory linking
fertility, human capital accumulation, and economic growth once we get to the modern advanced
economy with below replacement fertility. There are serious calls for such a contribution (see
Galor (2008) and Murphy (2009)). Unlike the majority of papers in the fertility and growth
literature, we do not attempt to model transition from underdevelopment to development. Our
goal is to construct a model of fertility and growth in advanced societies rather than to investigate
what happens during the process of development.
This paper argues that the degree of increasing returns to human capital in traditional production
technologies determines the nature of the long-term relationship between economic growth and
population growth in advanced countries. By traditional technologies, we mean labor-oriented
production processes prevalent in traditional manufacturing and services sectors. These sectors
have beneted largely from increasing returns to human capital generated through agglomeration
economies and the formation of cities throughout the second half of the twentieth century (see
Moretti (2004a), Moretti (2004b)).
Our theoretical structure combines the models developed by Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker
and Barro (1988), Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), and Lucas (1988). Like Becker and Lewis
1See, for example, Galor and Weil (1996), Galor and Moav (2002), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), Lagerloef (2003), Fernandez-
Villaverde (2004), Moav (2005), and Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008) for dierent perspectives on the determinants of this demo-
graphic transition. See Galor (2005) for an excellent survey.
2(1973) and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), quantity-quality tradeo at the aggregate level
is an important element in our analysis. Unlike these papers, we generate this tradeo in a
novel way: the goods cost of child rearing is an increasing function of the aggregate human
capital. This assumption communicates the idea that human capital is a cost element as well as
a productivity element for the society; that is, part of the human capital stock is accumulated
for the purpose of raising higher quality children. When the population starts declining, this
mechanism works in the opposite direction to produce extra resources for the society. We
explain this \eciency-augmenting mechanism" in greater detail in Section 2. Like Becker and
Barro (1988) and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), our model is based on a dynastic utility
structure. Like Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), we use this dynasty structure to construct
a growth model based on aggregate human capital. Unlike all other papers in the literature,
we insert this structure into an endogenous growth model|a l a Lucas (1988)|with increasing
returns to aggregate human capital in production. We work out a particular balanced growth
path and perform our analysis across steady state solutions. Our model produces two main
predictions. As the degree of increasing returns to human capital in traditional production
technologies falls,
(1) the population growth rates decline steadily, whereas the growth rates of per capita con-
sumption display a U-shaped pattern; and
(2) negative population growth and positive growth in per capita consumption can coexist.
The rst result says that when the increasing returns to human capital in traditional production
technologies are large, both the per capita consumption growth rate and population growth
rate are fairly high. As the increasing returns move down, the growth rates of per capita
consumption follow a U-shaped pattern. It is always positive. However, the population growth
rates fall steadily and can record negative numbers after reaching a threshold. The second result
follows immediately.
The rst question is: Is there any empirical evidence that increasing returns to human capital
have been falling throughout the world and are positively correlated with population growth
rates? We perform an empirical analysis in Section 3 and our answer is yes. Using educational
attainment data from Barro and Lee (2010), and for a sample of the biggest 50 countries in
terms of per capita consumption, we show that population growth rates and the returns to
human capital are positively correlated. Moreover, we provide time-series evidence that the
degree of increasing returns to human capital has been falling over time. These results are in
line with the literature arguing that population growth and the returns to human capital are
positively related (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992), Kremer (1993), and Glaeser
(1999)). Our estimates also show that the growth rates of per capita consumption follow a U-
shaped pattern as the degree of increasing returns to human capital falls. These estimates are
robust since we carry out empirical analysis in various dimensions including the time-series,
3panel-data, and cross-sectional perspectives, all of which yield similar results. These analyses
provide empirical conrmation that our theoretical results are sensible.
The motivation behind modeling the decline in the degree of increasing returns to human capital
in traditional production technologies comes from the literature investigating the population
structure in cities. Population in large cities starts going down after reaching a peak point
(Williamson (1965), Hansen (1990), and Henderson (2003)). This de-concentration happens
for two reasons: (i) the economy spreads knowledge to hinterland areas, or (ii) cities become
overcongested for the inhabitants. This regularity documented in empirical work including El-
Shakhs (1972), Alonso (1980), Wheaton and Shishido (1981), Junius (1999), and Davis and
Henderson (2003). Our theory is the macroeconomic counterpart of this argument.
The second issue is about how the model works. Traditional technologies are characterized
by labor-dependency in production. When the increasing returns to human capital are large,
the role of human capital on the aggregate productive capacity is so highly signicant that the
society can aord the cost of human capital used in producing children. Children will start
working when they grow up. In traditional production technologies, labor is complementary to
human capital. Thus, greater human capital stock generates greater work force and the economy
grows as a whole. As the degree of increasing returns to human capital in traditional production
technologies starts decreasing, the positive gap between the returns from human capital and the
cost of producing it decreases. This makes the growth rates of human capital (and, therefore,
the growth rates of per capita consumption) decline. The complementarity between human
capital and labor eort drives the population growth rates down. The endogenous eciency-
augmenting mechanism leads to the emergence of alternative labor-saving production methods.
These methods liberate the gains in productivity from the counterbalancing eects of population.
After a certain threshold, the population growth rates read negative numbers. Eventually, we
reach a point where the degree of increasing returns are low, population declines, and per capita
consumption (and human capital) grows. This mechanism paves the way for accelerated human
capital accumulation and the emergence of the modern state of sustained economic growth.
Kosai, Saito, and Yashiro (1998) argue that such a mechanism should necessarily work for the
potential coexistence of sustained economic growth and declining population without explicitly
describing the mechanism. Our paper proposes one such mechanism.
What justies the emergence of such a mechanism? Think of the banking sector. It used to
be one of the most labor-intensive sectors. Parallel to the rapid development of the internet
technology, the sector now trends toward to a concept called branchless banking. Another
example is the transformation that the technologies producing household durables and other
high-tech commodities have undergone. In Japan, human involvement in production and quality-
control stages in most plants are literally zero. It is possible to extend the list of examples. This
transformation leads to the emergence of alternative production technologies. In other words,
4the continuous increase in the productive capacities of these alternative technologies supports
lower population growth rates. Our model argues that all these developments are endogenous.
The third, and the last, question is: why is this progress? We contribute the literature in two
dimensions. (i) We show that the decline in the degree of increasing returns to human capital
drives population growth rates down to negative levels in the developed countries. This result is
important because it reconciles two competing views. On the one hand, the traditional growth
literature says that a larger population may hamper economic growth because of the diminishing
returns from more intensive use of land and other natural resources (Krugman (1991), Ciccone
and Hall (1996)). On the other hand, the urban economics argues that population growth and
economic growth are positively related since larger populations encourage greater specialization
and increased investments in knowledge (Kremer (1993) and Glaeser (1999)). These two views
have long been argued as being rival (see Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy (1999) for an explanation
why these views are believed to be rival). Our paper shows that these two are related issues
and they can can co-habit in a single model. (ii) We propose an endogenous growth model
which shows that a declining population and sustained economic growth in per capita terms can
coexist. This result suggests that a declining population is not such a big problem when the
individual well-being is concerned. Note that, in a standard Barro-Becker model with exogenous
growth (see Section 9.2.2 in Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003) for an example), it is possible to nd
a parameter conguration that gives a negative relationship between population growth and per
capita consumption growth. Our analysis is much richer in the sense that we describe a mech-
anism that produces an endogenous transition from a positive relationship between population
growth and per capita consumption growth to a negative one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and characterizes
the steady state solution. Section 3 shows that our numerical results are coherent and consistent
with the empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Environment
2.1 The Dynastic Utility
We build our analysis on the Barro-Becker model of dynastic altruism (see Becker and Barro
(1988)). Our starting point is a standard two-period overlapping generations setting. The utility
of an adult is an additively separable function of his own consumption and the utility of each
child weighted by the number of children and the degree of altruism toward each child. After
recursively substituting the utility of adult in the utility of children, we obtain a dynastic utility
representation similar to the one in the Barro-Becker model. We skip the derivation of the
resulting dynastic utility function and jump ahead into the problem.
5For simplicity, we formulate our model in continuous time (see Section 9.2.2 in Barro and Sala-i
Martin (2003) for a detailed explanation why a continuous-time overlapping generations formu-
lation is useful when one studies aggregate variables rather than family-level variables). This









where N(t) is population, C(t) is aggregate consumption,  2 (0;1) is the constant elasticity of
altruism per child as their number increases,  2 (0;1) is the rate of \pure" altruism, and  > 0
is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution.2
To comply with the standard assumptions in the fertility literature and to ensure that the
dynastic utility function is increasing and concave in C(t) and N(t), we impose the following
restrictions on the parameters.
Assumption 2.1. 0 <  <  < 1.
Let u(C(t);N(t)) = N(t)  C(t)1 
1  denote the period utility function. The rst inequality,
 > 0, ensures joint concavity, i.e., uCC < 0, uNN < 0, and uCNuNC   uCCuNN < 0. The
second inequality,  < 1, implies u > 0 and uC > 0. Finally, uN > 0 is ensured by  < . These
parametric restrictions imply that aggregate consumption and population are complements|the
cross partial of the period utility is positive|in dynastic utility. In other words, the period
utility is less than log utility, which implies a low curvature or a high elasticity of substitution.
This is the usual assumption in the Barro-Becker tradition. We maintain the complementarity
hypothesis throughout the paper.
2.2 Production, Resources, and Demographics
Our formulation of the technology and the resource constraint are closer to the Uzawa-Lucas
endogenous growth tradition. Following Lucas (1988), we assume that human capital evolves
over time according to the law of motion





where  2 (0;1) is the eectiveness of investment in human capital, _ h(t) denote the growth
of human capital, and [1   u(t)] 2 [0;1] is the fraction of total eort devoted to acquiring
more human capital. The rest of the eort, u(t), is devoted to producing the consumption
good. Production in this economy depends on the levels of human capital and labor inputs.
2This is equivalent to the setup in Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) and delivers simple analytical comparative statics results
across balanced growth paths.




+ = C(t) + h(t) _ N(t); (2.3)
where  2 (0;1),  2 (0;1), and  > 0.  reects the degree of increasing returns to human
capital. Notice that, unlike Lucas (1988), we do not distinguish between private and aggregate
variables for human capital, since we are not interested in the private solution. The increasing
returns parameter  is the key to our analysis. We call the production technology on the left-
hand side of the resource constraint (2.3) traditional; that is, labor eort and the human capital
stock enter the Cobb-Douglas production technology as complementary inputs.3
The traditional assumption in the literature is that, other than the time cost, there is a \goods
cost" of child rearing and it is only a function of the number of children; that is, in our language,
the literature formulates it as  _ N(t), where  converts the number of children into consumption
units (Becker and Barro (1988), Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990)). We believe that this
convention is inadequate since the goods cost of child rearing is actually a combination of the
number of children and the human capital stock in the economy. In other words, the goods
cost of child-rearing is h(t) _ N(t) in our model, where  converts this combination into the
consumption units. In terms of the planning problem, this means that when the planner chooses
the optimal path for the human capital accumulation, he should take into account the fact that
human capital is actually used in child rearing. This is an important feature of our analysis.
Notice that h(t) _ N(t) is a positive number|therefore, a cost element|when the population
growth rate is positive, whereas it turns negative|therefore, becomes an element of produc-
tion|when the population growth rate is negative. Transition of the sign of h(t) _ N(t) from
positive to negative is the endogenous eciency-augmenting mechanism that we discuss in this
paper. When the degree of increasing returns to human capital () in traditional technologies
decline, less children are produced since the productivity of the labor input starts falling short
of the cost of raising them. After some point, the population starts declining. Notice that when
_ N(t) < 0, additional units of the consumption good are produced in an alternative environment.
We interpret this shift as the transition from traditional (labor-oriented) production techniques
into the ones that are more compatible with an aging population|such as branchless banking,
humanless production lines, humanless quality control, etc. In a realistic case, these two produc-
tion processes coexist, which means that population growth and per capita consumption growth
coexist.
Such a formulation is consistent with what the basic quantity-quality theory of children says.
Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976) argue that the cross partial of the cost
function, h(t) _ N(t), must have a positive sign. In other words, the cost of an additional child,
3Including physical capital into this technology does not change the main predictions of our model. Hence, we drop physical
capital for algebraic simplicity. We include physical capital in Section 3.2, where we report our estimates.
7holding the quality input xed, is greater the higher the number of children is. Similarly, the
cost of a unit increase in quality, holding the quantity xed, is greater the higher the number of
children is.  > 0 ensures that the sign of this cross partial is positive.
Notice the peculiar nature of the demographics in our model. In the literature, the standard law
of motion for population is n(t) = b(t)   d(t) = _ N(t)=N(t), where b(t) is the birth rate, d(t) is
the death rate, and n(t) is the resulting net rate of change in population at time t. We do not
explicitly model b(t) and d(t) in our model and focus on n(t) only, which will become a constant,
N, along the balanced growth path. In other words, we abstract from the considerations such
as the size of each generation or the number of children produced in each period. In such a
setup, a negative (positive) net population growth rate means that death rate is higher (lower)
than the birth rate in the economy. We do this simplication since we are only interested in
whether the steady state population growth rate N is positive or negative. Similar to Lucas
(1988), our interpretation of h(t) is that it is the aggregate know-how in an economy rather
than being generation-specic human capital. This is the main reason why we do not need to
explicitly model the birth/death process. We focus on the interaction between the properties
of the aggregate production process and the aggregate population dynamics, which does not
require explicit birth and death rates.
Two key features of this discussion should perhaps be reemphasized. First, there is increasing
returns to human capital. Second, the goods cost of child rearing is a function of both human
capital and the number of children, rather than being a function of the number of children
only. The former determines whether a declining population is optimal and the latter ensures
that there is a particular solution to our model (i.e., a particular balanced growth path) with
properties we are specically interested in.
2.3 The Planner's Problem
The social planner chooses the time paths of the dynasty level variables (see Alvarez (1999) for



















where (t) and (t) are the shadow prices used to value increments to population and human
capital, respectively. There are two control variables: the aggregate consumption, C(t), and the













+ 2 = : (2.6)
Equation (2.5) states that, on the margin, the consumption good must be equally valuable across
its two uses: consumption and producing children. Similarly, Equation (2.6) states that time,
the other control variable, must be equally valuable in its two uses: production of human capital
and production of children.
The shadow prices evolve according to






















  (1   u): (2.8)
Thus, Equations (2.2) and (2.3) and (2.5)-(2.8), together with the transversality conditions
lim
t!1e




 t(t)h(t) = 0; (2.10)
implicitly describe the optimal evolution of N(t) and h(t) from any initial mix of these two state
variables.
2.4 Characterizing the Balanced Growth Path
We start by guessing that there is a particular solution (a particular balanced growth path) in
which u is constant. Let this constant be ~ u. In fact, the same constant ~ u will work no matter




= (1   ~ u) (2.11)
where h is the steady state growth rate of the aggregate human capital stock. In other words,
~ u is independent of the level of h. If there exist such a ~ u, then (2.11) holds. The discussion in
the rest of this section proves, in a rather informal way, that such a solution exists.
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1  + (1   )
#
(2.12)
where N = _ N(t)=N(t) and  = _ (t)=(t) are constants by denition of a balanced growth
path. Equation (2.12) implies that C(t)=(N(t)h(t)) is constant or, dierentiating, that
C = N + h (2.13)
where C = _ C(t)=C(t). This expression states that, along the steady-state growth path, aggre-
gate consumption growth will be equal to the sum of the growth rates of population and human
capital stock. Obviously,  = C  N is the growth rate of per capita consumption. Therefore,
Equation (2.13) says that per capita consumption growth must be equal to the growth rate of
human capital. The striking result is that nonnegative values for population growth is not neces-
sary for sustainable economic growth. Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy (1999) sketch out a similar
idea without providing a formal model. This paper complements their eort by introducing
a fully specied growth model. Next we examine what determines whether N is negative or
positive.








The right-hand side is a constant by (2.12). It means that the left-hand side must also be a
constant. Dierentiating (2.14) gives us the following key result:
N =
 +    1

h: (2.15)
We summarize what this expression communicates in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. At an interior solution for u, h is positive and
(i) N > 0, if  +  > 1;
(ii) N = 0, if  +  = 1, and;
(iii) N < 0, if  +  < 1.
In words, when the degree of increasing returns to human capital in traditional production
processes are strong enough to yield  +  > 1, population and per capita consumption grow
together. When the opposite is true, population growth rates are negative and the growth rates
of per capita consumption are positive.
10Proposition 1 states that economic growth can be sustained in modern economies regardless
of the sign of the growth rate of population. When increasing returns are strong enough (i.e.,
 +  > 1), returns to a growing population is larger than the total cost of child rearing.
Therefore, population grows and reinforces the economic growth. When the opposite is true,
a steady decline in population combined with growing human capital stimulates an eciency-
augmenting mechanism. This is more easily seen through the aggregate resource constraint.
When N is negative, the cost of child rearing, h(t) _ N(t), reads a negative number. The intuition
is the following. An increasing scarcity of labor would stimulate more ecient utilization of
resources, highlighting \gains in eciency". In other words, an endogenously induced mechanism
counteracts the decline in population.
To complete the characterization of the steady-state, we dierentiate the rst-order conditions
(2.5) and (2.6), and use (2.15), to get
 = (   )N   C + h (2.16)
and
    = N   h; (2.17)
where  = _ (t)=(t). One more equation is needed to close the system with six linearly
independent equations in six unknowns. Combining (2.7) and (2.8), we obtain
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A full characterization of the balanced growth path requires that the transversality conditions
(2.9) and (2.10) jointly hold. The rst one is satised if  + N < . Similarly, the second
one is satised if  +h < . These are standard conditions and they should be paid attention
when parameterizing the model.
2.5 Solution
Notice that each and every variable in the system can be rewritten as a function of ~ u only,
although there is no analytical solution to our model. The easiest way to solve for this system is
to carry out a simple xed point analysis. We take two equations containing  and write them
as functions of ~ u only. This yields two equations in two unknowns.
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where we let `
 denote the left-hand side of the xed point equation. Collecting the terms with
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(1   ~ u): (2.20)
On the right-hand side, we have the expression coming from Equation (2.18). After substituting
N and  into (2.18), the right-hand side becomes

r
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To sketch out the characteristics of the solution more concretely and to establish a unique
solution to our model, we impose the following additional restriction:
Assumption 2.2.  +  > 1.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2 and given ;; 2 (0;1), `
 is monotonically increasing
in u.
Proof: For `
 to increase monotonically in u, it has to be the case from (2.20) that  >
(1 )(+ 1). Rearranging this inequality yields (+ 1) > ( 1)(1 ). By ; 2 (0;1),
the right-hand side is negative. By Assumption 2 and  2 (0;1), the left-hand side is positive.
The proof follows. 
It is also possible to prove that r
 is monotonically decreasing in u for a feasible set of param-
eters.4 Therefore, the point where r
 and `
 cross over gives us ~ u. This implies that if such a
solution exists, it is unique.
3 Empirical and Numerical Results
In this section, we present our numerical results and provide empirical support for the predictions
of our model. Our model does not have an analytical solution. We run a xed point algorithm, as
4The proof is available upon request. Section 3 gives one set of parameters which yield a unique solution to the planning problem.
12described in Section 2.5, to compute the balanced growth path. First, in the following subsection,
we discuss our theoretical ndings in light of a simple simulation exercise based on a standard
parameterization. Then, we describe the data we use in our empirical analysis and we report
our results along with the estimation procedure. We conclude that the numerical results and
the estimates are consistent.
3.1 Numerical Results
The main hypotheses of this paper are that (1) the degree of increasing returns to human capital
in traditional technologies has been falling over time and (2) population growth rates and the
degree of increasing returns are in positive correlation. Given these hypotheses, we ask whether
sustained economic growth and declining population can coexist. In this subsection, we verify
that the second hypothesis holds given the rst one. Moreover, our model predicts that sustained
economic growth and declining population can coexist. The experiment we perform here is to
evaluate what would happen to the population growth rates and the growth rates of per capita
consumption when we exogenously feed the model with a declining sequence for the parameter
 which represents the increasing returns to human capital.
Our parameterization is in line with the literature. For , we follow the Barro-Becker tradition
and set it to be less than one ( = 0:85). That is, we stick with the complementarity assumption.
Remember that the Assumption 1 imposes the restriction 0 <  < . In line with this restriction
and following Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), we choose  = 0:25. We set  = 1, but
this really does not aect the steady state solution in our model. For pure altruism, we choose
 = 0:09. Since we solve our model in a continuous-time setting, the pure altruism parameter
in Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) is equal to 1=(1 + ). Note that  = 0:09 corresponds
to a slightly higher degree of pure altruism than Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) assumes
in their model. We pick this higher value to make sure that the transversality conditions (2.9)
and (2.10) are satised. Our choice of  = 0:07 is consistent with the calculations reported in
Lucas (1988). We pick  = 0:55 to reect the notion that traditional production technologies in
the modern world are human capital intensive.
Figure (3.1) reports the results of the experiment. It shows that, as the degree of increasing
returns to human capital in traditional production technologies decline, population growth rates
fall and growth rates of per capita consumption follows a U-shaped pattern. When  falls, the
economy switches from traditional technologies that need young workers to other human capital
oriented production processes supporting an older population.
This shift produces two relationship patterns between population growth rates and the growth
rates of per capita consumption. Initially, they move down together at relatively higher levels of
. Then, as  falls further, they start moving in opposite directions. These two distinct patterns
13Figure 3.1: The eect of a decline in the degree of increasing returns to human capital on the growth rates of
population and per capita consumption. We set  = 0:85,  = 0:07,  = 0:25,  = 1,  = 0:09, and  = 0:55.
reconciliates two dierent views in the literature. While the traditional growth literature argues
that the latter part must hold in the developed world, the literature linking economic growth to
formation and population trends in urban areas argues that the former part must be true. Our
model accomodates these two views. We argue that when increasing returns to human capital
are high, growth rates of population and per capita consumption move in the same direction.
The degree of increasing returns starts falling for some reason|maybe due to congestion or
diusion of knowledge to less populated areas. After a certain threshold, growth rates of per
capita consumption pick up, but the population growth rates keep falling and turn negative
eventually. Such a view is consistent with a strand in the urban economics literature, which
mainly argues that city formation patterns follow an inverse U-shaped evolution.
These results supports the coexistence of declining population and sustained economic growth.
The main idea is the substantial shift from labor-oriented production patterns to less labor-
oriented production patterns. This shift is endogenous and emerges as a reaction to the decline
in the degree of increasing returns to human capital in traditional production. Next we provide
empirical support for our claim.
3.2 Data and Estimates
In this subsection, our ultimate purpose is to perform an estimation based on the functional form
of the production function we propose in Section 2.2. To perform the empirical analysis, we need
time series data on GDP, population, aggregate level of human capital, and aggregate hours of
work. We obtain population, aggregate hours of work, and GDP data from the Total Economy
Database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. We construct the aggregate human
capital series based on the educational attainment data from Barro and Lee (2010).
Our focus is to provide evidence in support of the results underlined in Proposition 1. Specically,
14Figure 3.2: The regression results for the relationship between population growth and the increasing returns to
human capital.
we want to estimate  +  for a large number of countries and, then, examine the correlation
between these estimates and the growth rates of population from a cross-section, time-series and
panel perspectives. Provided that Proposition 1 is supported by the data, our expectation is
that estimates of  + are negatively correlated with population growth rates. We perform two
dierent exercises for the examination of this hypothesis.
3.2.1 First Pass
In our rst empirical exercise, we estimate the following equation5 within a panel-data setting6
ln(Yi;t) = 1t + 2t ln(Ni;t) + 3t ln(hi;t) + 4t ln(Ki;t) + i;t (3.1)
where Yi;t stands for the real GDP for country i, in year t, Ki;t is the aggregate level of physical
capital7, Ni;t is the aggregate hours of work, and hi;t is the aggregate level of human capital. As
one can notice from the subscripts of the coecients, we want to allow the coecients to vary
over time. To obtain the time-variant estimates of 3t, we recursively estimate the regression
equation (3.1) using panel least squares several times, each with a dierent time span.
In Figure (3.2), we draw the growth rate of the total population in our whole sample consisting
of 50 countries against the recursive OLS estimates of 3t from 1960 to 2009. As evident from
the gure, there is a strong positive correlation between estimates of 3t and the population
growth rates, i.e., our rst pass in the empirical analysis provides support for the hypothesis
that a stronger increasing returns to human capital is associated with a higher rate of population
5Notice that the production function specied in the model section doesn't employ capital. In this section however, we include
amount of aggregate capital among the explanatory variables when estimating the production function. We should mention that
estimations and results are not prone to the inclusion or exclusion of capital. Estimation results without capital are available upon
request from the authors.
6Our panel consists of 50 countries in total and has a time span of 60 years from 1950 to 2009.
7We obtain capital stock series using the well known perpetual inventory method and a standard capital accumulation equation.
Data on investment is obtained from Penn World Tables and the Worldbank.
15Figure 3.3: The relationship between per capita consumption growth and the increasing returns to human capital.
growth. Notice that the relationship between the growth rates of per capita consumption and
the degree of increasing returns to human capital displays a U-shaped pattern as suggested by
the model (see Figure (3.3)).
3.2.2 Second Pass
In addition to the simple analysis we perform above, we conduct a more detailed analysis which
provides us much stronger support for our hypothesis. This analysis basically consists of two
steps. In the rst step, we estimate the following regression equation for each of the 50 countries
in our data set over the period from 1950 to 2009:
ln(Yt) = 1;t + 2;t ln(Nt) + 3;t ln(ht) + 4;t ln(Kt) + t: (3.2)
Again, Yt stands for real GDP in year t, Nt is hours of work, Kt is the aggregate physical capital,
and ht is aggregate level of human capital of that particular country. Estimating equation (3.2)
for 50 countries using recursive OLS allows us to obtain estimates of 3t, ^ 
[i]
3t, for each of these
countries. In the next step, we use these estimates to examine the relationship between growth
rate of population and the increasing returns to human capital in a panel setting. The regression
equation that we estimate in this step is the following:





kXki;t + i + t + i;t (3.3)
where i;t is the growth rate of population for country i, in year t, Xki;t are the other explanatory
variables in addition to ^ 
[i]
3t, and i, t are the country and period xed eects, respectively.
Finally, i;t is the error term. The results of these panel regressions are reported in Table (1).
As evident from Table (1), in all the regressions we report, the estimates of the coecient of
interest (1) are positive and signicant. In total, we run 4 panel regressions. The rst three
16Dependent variable: Population Growth
Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS GMM
Increasing Returns 0.81*** 1.12*** 1.69*** 1.37***
(3.99) (2.82) (2.57) (3.02)
GDP -0.24* -0.52*** -0.31***
(1.71) (3.28) (3.42)




R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08
Observations 2221 2221 2164 2164
F-Test 6.88 11.56
Hansen J-Test 0.08
Table 1: Population growth and the degree of increasing returns to human capital. All panel regressions include
year and country xed eects. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coecient estimates.
of the panel regressions report OLS estimates with dierent control variables in each. Finally,
in the last column, we report results from a dynamic GMM estimation using the Arellano-Bond
estimator to take into account the serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity prob-
lems that may occur in such dynamic settings.8 The fact that the estimate of 1 is signicantly
positive in all types of regressions provide strong support for Proposition 1.
4 Concluding Remarks
The demographic transition that reversed the strong population growth trend that the developed
world experienced during the early stages of industrialization and brought about lower fertility
rates has been the subject of intensive research in the literature. The literature has been success-
ful in bringing alternative explanations for this transition. However, once we get to the modern
advanced economy, the determinants of fertility and their interaction with macroeconomic forces
are not well understood.
This paper argues that the decline in the degree of increasing returns to human capital in
traditional production technologies might have led the economies to switch their productive
eorts from labor-oriented technologies that require a constant creation of young workforce
toward technologies that support an aging population structure. We demonstrate that, in such
an environment, sustained economic growth and declining population can coexist. In support
of our theoretical claim, we provide robust empirical evidence that increasing returns to human
capital in traditional production technologies have been falling over time.
Our results suggest that a declining population is not a worry for modern economies, if en-
8Here we use aggregate level of human capital as an instrument for ^ 
[i]
3t.
17dogenously induced mechanisms are suciently eective. Such a mechanism will shift the mod-
ern economies from input-driven technologies toward gains-in-eciency type production models.
Our paper shows theoretically and empirically that the decline in the degree of increasing returns
to human capital in labor-oriented production technologies may generate such an endogenous
shift.
18References
Alonso, W. (1980). Five bell shapes in development. Papers of the Regional Science Associa-
tion 45, 5{16.
Alvarez, F. (1999). Social mobility: The Barro-Becker children meet the Laitner-Loury dynasties.
Review of Economic Dynamics 2, 65{103.
Barro, R. J. and J. Lee (2010). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 19502010.
NBER Working Paper Series, #15902.
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i Martin (2003). Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Becker, G. S. and R. J. Barro (1988). A reformulation of the economic theory of fertility.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 1{25.
Becker, G. S., E. L. Glaeser, and K. M. Murphy (1999). Population and economic growth.
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 89, 145{149.
Becker, G. S. and G. Lewis (1973). On the interaction between the quantity and quality of
children. Journal of Political Economy 81, S279{S288.
Becker, G. S., K. M. Murphy, and R. Tamura (1990). Human capital, fertility, and economic
growth. Journal of Political Economy 98, S12{S37.
Becker, G. S. and N. Tomes (1976). Child endowments and the quantity and quality of children.
Journal of Political Economy 84, S143{S162.
Ciccone, A. and R. E. Hall (1996). Productivity and the density of economic activity. American
Economic Review 86(1), 54{70.
Davis, J. C. and J. V. Henderson (2003). Evidence on the political economy of the urbanization
process. Journal of Urban Economics 53, 98{125.
El-Shakhs, S. (1972). Development, primacy, and systems of cities. Journal of Developing
Areas 7, 11{36.
Fernandez-Villaverde, J. (2004). Was Malthus right? Economic growth and population dynam-
ics. Unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
Galor, O. (2005). The demographic transition and the emergence of sustained economic growth.
Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 3, 494{504.
Galor, O. (2008). An interview by Brian Snowdon. World Economics 9, 97{151.
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2002). Natural selection and the origin of economic growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 117, 1133{1192.
19Galor, O. and D. N. Weil (1996). The gender gap, fertility and growth. American Economic
Review 86, 374{387.
Galor, O. and D. N. Weil (1999). From Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 89, 150{154.
Galor, O. and D. N. Weil (2000). Population, technology and growth: From Malthusian stag-
nation to demographic transition and beyond. American Economic Review 90, 806{828.
Glaeser, E. L. (1999). Learning in cities. Journal of Urban Economics 46(2), 254{277.
Glaeser, E. L., H. D. Kallal, J. A. Scheinkman, and A. Shleifer (1992). Growth in cities. Journal
of Political Economy 100(6), 1126{1152.
Gould, E. D., O. Moav, and A. Simhon (2008). The mystery of monogamy. American Economic
Review 98, 333{357.
Hansen, N. (1990). Impacts on small and intermediate-sized cities on population distribution:
Issues and responses. Regional Development Dialogue 11, 60{76.
Hazan, M. and B. Berdugo (2002, October). Child labor, fertility and economic growth. Eco-
nomic Journal 112, 810{828.
Henderson, V. (2003). The urbanization process and economic growth: The so-what question.
Journal of Economic Growth 8, 47{71.
Jones, L. E. and A. Schoonbroodt (2010). Complements versus substitutes and trends in fertility
choice in dynastic models. International Economic Review 51(3), 671{699.
Junius, K. (1999). Primacy and economic development: Bell-shaped or parallel growth of cities?
Journal of Economic Development 24, 1{22.
Kosai, Y., J. Saito, and N. Yashiro (1998). Declining population and sustained economic growth:
Can they coexist? American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 88(2), 412{416.
Kremer, M. (1993). Population growth and technological change: One billion B.C. to 1990.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 681{716.
Krugman, P. R. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 99(3), 483{499.
Lagerloef, N. P. (2003). From Malthus to modern growth: The three regimes revisited. Inter-
national Economic Review 44, 755{777.
Lucas, R. E. J. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary
Economics 22, 3{42.
20Moav, O. (2005, January). Cheap children and the persistence of poverty. Economic Journal 115,
88{110.
Moretti, E. (2004a). Human capital externalities in cities. In V. Henderson and J. F. Thisse
(Eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, pp. 2243{2291. Amsterdam: Elsevier-
North Holland.
Moretti, E. (2004b). Workers' education, spillovers, and productivity: Evidence from plant-level
production functions. American Economic Review 94, 656{690.
Murphy, K. M. (2009). Interview with Kevin Murphy. In D. Clement (Ed.), The Region.
Minneapolis, MN: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Wheaton, W. and H. Shishido (1981). Urban concentration, agglomeration economies, and the
level of economic development. Economic Development and Cultural Change 30, 17{30.
Williamson, J. (1965). Regional inequality and the process of national development. Economic
Development and Cultural Change 13, 3{45.
21